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Introduction
The transition to civilian rule in Brazil is perhaps the most intensely studied alternation
of regime in recent Latin American history. It has been the subject of some very innovative
treatises, many with wider comparative implications, which are far toa numemus 00review (or even
list) in this space.1 Recognizing these impressive contributions, and not intending 00detract'from
the analytical validity of any one of them, this essay seeks 00interpret the transition in Brazil from
a theoretical perspective heretofore underutilized in the líterature. Strategic choice analysis is a
thriving subdisciptine in the field of polítical theory which is increasingly being called into use by
students of comparative potitics.
Strategic choice analysis has been criticized from a number of viewpoints. This debate
cannot be addressed here; rather, this essay has much more modest objectives. One is simply to
add a new perspective to the study of the Brazilian transition by discussing it in the context and
terminology of strategic choice theory. A second objective is to attempt to fit Adam Przeworski's
(1986) model of strategic choice to the realities of the Brazilian transition. From the empiricist's
point of view, this objective can be met only partially because of theoretical considerations (00 be
discussed below) and because the events analyzed are very recent. This essay is designed to offer
purely preliminary reflections on this altemative conceptualization of the transition.
The paper is divided into three main sections. First, 1 review Przeworski's model of
democratic transition. Then 1 review two polítical "games" that were played in Brazil in
1984-1985. Finally, 1 compare the two games both in structure and in the context of collective
action theory. 1 conclude with conunents on the relationship of these two games to the substantive
content of Brazil's new democracy.
Theoretical Background
Strategic choice analysis is perhaps most useful for explaining political events in the
short run. As David Collier and Deborah Norden have recently noted, this type of analysis allows us
to explain systematically those phenomena which we sometimes consider "the banalities of
practical palitics."
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[Strategic choi~e analysis] is built on relatively obvious facts of political
life, such as: (1) politicalleaders seek to build coalitions to promote their
goals; (2) leaders are often, though not always, better off if they build
coalitions in a way that wins new supporters without unnecessarily
antagonizing opponents; (3) actors may switch sides in a political battle
simply out of a desire to "go with the winner"; (4) leaders must therefore
try to convince potential supporters that they will in fact win; and (5) to
the extent that leaders are skilled at these tasks, they are more likely to
achieve their goals. (Collier and Norden, 1986: 7)
All of these phenomena were present in the 1984-1985 transition to civilian rule in
Brazil. (Henceforth 1 shall use "transition" to mean the dynamic period from January 1984 to
January 1985, rather than the 1974-1985 period of gradualliberalization.) Tancredo Neves, a true
"political entrepreneur," successfully built a coalition that assured bis election in the Electoral
College on January 15, 1985. This event signaled the end of twenty-one years of military rule in
Brazil.
The critical factor making Neves's election possible was the split in the
military-dominated government and the crucial number of government party members who deserted
their candidate (paulo Salim Malut) to vote for Tancredo in the indirect election. Given the relative
stability of the Brazilian system of bureaucratic-authoritarian domination, how was it that members
of the PDS (Partido Democrático Social, the progovernment party) were induced to defect from
their party, thereby virtually assuring the end of the military regime? To phrase the same question
theoretically, what is the strategic ealeulus facing proauthoritarian politicians during the uncertain
l»:riod of politicalliberalization?
Przeworski (1986) has attempted to answer this question. Writing in 1979, he
construeted a simple model of the alternative8 open to authoritarian elites during liberalization. His
analysis is influenced by Thomas C. Schelling's (1978) discussion of k-groups (k being the
number of actors necessary to provide a collective good). If k, for our purposes, is the number oí'
actors (authoritarian elites) neeessary to aehieve a successful transition to civilian rule, then thcir
stratcgie ealculus looks something like this:
If 1 move and fewer than (k-l) others join, then 1 am likely to suffer
unpleasant consequences. If 1 move and (k-l) others join, 1 will belong to
a victorious movement and can expect to be rewarded appropriately. If I do
not move and fewer than k others do, 1 will remain on the side of power
and benefit fram it. Finally, if 1 do not move, but more than (k-l) others
do, I will again find myself on the losing side. Note that the value of the
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outcome increases as the number of actors making a move approaches le,
from both sides. (Przeworski 1986: 54-55)
Przeworski notes that in his model, actors' choices are crucially affected by expectations
of success. When the liberalization game is under way and coalition building begins in eamest, no
position is "safe" for any player, given the very high stakes of this game (that is, the form of the
political regime itself, and, in our case, the future vote-getting potential of civilian, proauthoritarian
politicians). "What this analysis implies, therefore, is that interests may be quite stable throughout
the process but that they will be a poor predictor of behavior when expectations of success shift
rapidly" (p. 55). In other words, actors (politicians) may have political or ideological priorities that
they will immediately drop when confronted with changing expectations of success or failure
("flip-flopping," in the North American political vernacular, and a "banality of practical politics"
explicitly recognized by Collier and Norden). In light of this reality, Przeworski notes, "group
analysis may generate weak predictions when groups are identified only by their interests" (p. 55).
Table 1








None: relevant in 1970s
Mechanism of succession
not institutionalized
Some relevance: Gen. Figueiredo
fails to "impose" successor, as did
bis predecessor
Economic crisis Relevant: recovery under way, but
regime still harshly criticized
Loss oflegitimacy,




It is fairly easy for us to accept that group interests are poor predictors of actors' behavior
once the liberalization game has been initiated. But how does the game begin in the flrst place?
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Przeworski points to two types of "signals" that can start the game. One type is "putschist,"
meaning "rumors that someone will make a move." Another type consists of "objective" signals,
meaning that all interested actors "have good grounds to expect that some conflict within the ruling
bloc will arise" (p. 55). Przeworski offers severa! examples, surnmarized in Table 1, of what might
be seen as objective signals.
Either putschist or objective signals may indicate that the líberalization game is about to
begin. We may date the actual beginning of the game from the moment in which key actors within
the ruling bloc begin to seek support among actors who have been excluded from políticallife under
the authoritarian regime. This phenomenon, according to Przeworski, is "always" present in any
polítical opening and represents "the fIrst critical threshold in the transition to democracy" (p. 56).
At this point the game of coalítion-building begins, and authoritarian elítes must
calculate their strategy in terms of their relative expectations of success. Should they continue to
support the authoritarian regime, or defect from it in the hopes of building a more viable polítical
future (for themselves, of course)? The game does not necessarily conclude with the instauration of
a democratic regime, although this was the case in Brazil in 1985.
The Two Games in Brazil
przeworski's model of strategic calculus provides a very useful analytic framework from
which to sketch the demise of the Brazilian authoritarian regime. It is particularly useful for
describing the game of polítical maneuvering that went on in Brazil between May and November
1984. However, this game, which was played exclusively by polítical and milítary elítes, was
preceded by yet another game, which saw the participation of civil society. This earlier game also
fIts into przeworski's model in the form of an "objective signal." I am referring here to the diretas
já campaign, the mass mobilízation in favor of direct elections which took place from January to
April 1984.
In the remainder of this essay, I will describe the essence of these two polítical "games"
played in Brazil in 1984. The fIrst game was played (generally) at the level of the masses.2 The
second represented a retum to more traditionaUy Brazilian polítical norms and was played within the
confInes of the professional polítical c1ass. The outcome of the fIrst game crucially affected the
conduct of the second, and both contributed to the end of the authoritarian regime. I will argue that
the opposition's eventual victory can be largely attributed to the change in the nature of the polítical
game.
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Game One: Mass Mobilization
With very few exceptions, mass mobilizations have not been a feature of
twentieth-century Brazilian politics.3 This was especially true in the climate of generalized
depoliticization that ensued after the military imposed the repressive Fifth Institutional Act (Al-5)
in 1968. This decree drastically curtailed the activities of the opposition until the Act's abolition
at the end of the Geisel government (1974-1979). Beginning with the Sáo Paulo strikes of 1978,
civil society slowly began to reclaim its right to freedom of assembly, although often paying a
heavy price. By the time of the 1982 electoral campaign, opposition leaders were openly
mobilizing the popular sectors against the military regime. But there was no precedent under the
military regime for the diretas já campaign of early 1984. Both in terms of numbers and of sheer
political relevance, the 1984 mass mobilizations were unprecedented in Brazilian history.
The campaign for direct elections originated within the Party of the Brazilian Democratic
Movement (PMDB), the largest opposition party. In December 1983, leaders of the Sáo Paulo
PMDB (Gov. André Franco Montoro, Seno Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and federal deputy and
national party president UIysses Guimaráes) invited representatives from the three other opposition
parties to begin plotting a strategy for the campaign, which would last from January to Apri11984.
On April 25, the national Chamber of Deputies was scheduled to vote on the proposed Dante de
Oliveira Amendment, which would reestablish direct elections for the presidency for the flrst time
since 1960. Because the government party (the PDS) controlled a simple majority (361 PDS to
325 opposition delegates) in the Electoral College, opposition leaders reasoned that only direct
elections would result in a real transition to democracy. In the event of direct elections, it was
widely assumed that any government candidate, except perhaps for the liberal Vice-President of the
Republic, Aureliano Chaves, would lose.
The diretas já campaign was impressive and inspiring from the day of its inception,
January 12, 1984, in the southern city of Curitiba. Two weeks later, almost a quarter of a million
people rallied in Sáo Paulo. Hundreds of demonstrations were held throughout the country in
February and March. The campaign was clearly something new and exciting for Brazil--the
populace relished the participation, the media relished the spectacle, and the politicians relished the
populace and the media. The country's most popular t-shirts were emblazoned with the words
"diretas já" and "eu quero votar pra presidente" ("1want to vote for president"). Marchers wore the
national colors, green and yellow, and hoisted the national flag--indeed, the opposition's campaign
had strong patriotic overtones. The campaign wound up with enormous demonstrations of over one
million people each in Rio (AprillO) and Sáo Paulo (AprilI6).
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Despite these apparent successes, the campaign did not achieve its stated objective. On
April 25, the Dante de Oliveira Amendment failed to muster the necessary two-thirds of the vote in
the Chamber of Deputies. Although supported by 62 percent of the legislators, the amendment still
lacked twenty-two votes.
The diretas já campaign ended testily, as the government imposed a state of emergency
in Brasilia on the day of the vote. Opposition activists in Brasilia, crushed by the defeat of the bid
for direct elections, suffered the additional ignominy of being jailed simply for wearing the national
colors. Unbeknownst to them, perhaps, this was to be the military regime's last great show of
force. We may date the end of Game One, the game of mass mobilization, as April25, 1984.
It would be incorrect to infer from the defeat of the Dante de Oliveira Amendment that the
opposition had "Iost" the mobilization game. As Mainwaring (1986: 160) points out, the diretas já
campaign achieved two things: it gave the opposition a sense of confidence unknown since 1968,
and it provoked a deep crisis in the ruling bloc. Faced with an unprecedented mobilization on the
part of the Brazilian people, and faced with opinion polls that showed the population nearly
unanimous in its support for diretas. many PDS politieians began to reconsider their political
futures. Most important among these was Viee-President Chaves, who announced his support for
direct elections on February 8. It became a disastrous politicalliability to oppose direct elections.
In fact, by the time of the April 25 roIl caIl, only 65 of the 235 PDS deputies had the courage to do
so. Of the rest, 3 abstained, 55 voted in favor of direct elections, and 112 were absent (Lamounier
and MenegueIlo 1986: 125).
The diretas já campaign had real, tangible effects. The opposition had invented a
marvelous mechanism by which to raise the political stakes for those civilian politicians who stood
with the military government Although it appeared that indirect elections would still be held, the
opposition had succeeded in stripping the last vestiges of legitimacy from the authoritarian regime.
The przeworski model suggests that mass unrest will provoke a "division within the ruling bloc."
This is exactly what happened in Brazil in mid-1984.
Game Two: Elite Conciliation
The mobilization for direct elections was not spontaneous, of course. Although it drew
its primary strength from the masses, the campaign was coordinated by several opposition
politicians (Montoro, UIysses, governor of Rio de Janeiro Leonel Brizola, Worker's Party president
Lula, among others) who clearly had personal interests in the holding of direct popular elections.
These were politieians who thrived on mass polities. In contrast, Tancredo Neves, then the
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governor of Minas Gerais state, was not such a politician. Although Tancredo openly supported
diretas já and appeared at several major rallies, he privately considered the carnpaign to be utopian.
His preferred style of politics "was better suited to behind-the-scenes negotiations with political and
military elites than to mobilization of the masses" (Mainwaring 1986: 168). In other words,
Tancredo was a talented practitioner of the oldest and most important garne in Brazilian politics:
"concilia~áo das elites" (elite conciliation). When Garne Two began in eamest on April25, 1984,
Tancredo became its outstanding player within weeks.
Irnrnediately after the defeat of the direct elections arnendment, key opposition figures
becarne resigned to the faet that the presidential succession would now be played out in the Electoral
College. To win the election, a "consensus" candidate was needed, a moderate figure who could
unite the opposition, pacify the military, and perhaps win some PDS votes in the Electoral
College. Tancredo Neves appeared to be such a candidate; he had vast govemmental experience and
a record of twenty years of solid opposition to the rnilitary regime, yet he was considered the most
rnoderate of the major figures within the PMDB.
As Tancredo's narne began to circulate widely, the opposition was also gaining from
developments on the other side of the fence. It appeared that the corrupt and unpopular former
governor of Sáo Paulo, Paulo Maluf, was poised to capture the PDS nomination. Maluf was a
kind of anti-Tancredo; he too stood to benefit from indirect elections (he fumIy and consistentIy
opposed diretas ), yet cynics thought his success resulted more from his enormous personal war
chest than from any particular worth or competence as a candidate. His nomination would be
anathema to moderate sectors within his party.
The first stage (April-July 1984) of Game Two was played by civilian politicians. The
first move in this garne was made by eight PDS governors from the Northeast, who collectively
announced their support for Tancredo on April 27. Tancredo had not yet announced his candidacy
(ibid.: 170). Thus began the Neves coalition, although at the outset Tancredo himself took no
public role in the coalition building, leaving this to other PMDB leaders. Also at about this time,
Senator José Samey of Maranháo, the president of the PDS who opposed the nomination of Maluf,
speculated on national television that Tancredo rnight be an acceptable "candidato de concilia~áo."
A month later, on June 11, Samey, confronted by the irnrninent nomination of Maluf, made the
spectacular gesture of resigning the presidency of the PDS. Samey was soon followed by other
PDS luminaries, including Sens. Jorge Bornhausen and Marco Maeiel. These and other deserters
formed a new party called the Liberal Front, which sapped the reeling PDS of much of its best
talent, as well as much of its perceived voting strength in the Electoral College.
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Meanwhile, in the PMDB camp, unity was building around the candidacy of Tancredo
Neves. On June 19, nine other opposition governors met in Sáo Paulo to persuade Tancredo to
announce his candidacy. Three days later, he did so. Within the PMDB, the final obstacle to his
endorsement was removed on June 29, when Ulysses Guimaráes, under pressure from Montoro and
others, agreed to drop his own presidential ambitions in favor of Tancredo. Thus, by the end of
June, there were three major divisions in the political elite. The PMDB (and to a lesser extent, the
smaller opposition parties) had coalesced around Tancredo. The much-weakened PDS continued its
ill-fated drive toward the nomination of Maluf. In the center, so to speak, the Liberal Front was
leaning strongly toward an official endorsement ofNeves. Uncommitted politicians were playing a
game of musical chairs.
By the end of July, the major coalitions had largely stabilized. The last key player to take
sides was Vice-President Aureliano Chaves, who had been lobbied by Liberal Front members since
early June to declare his support for Tancredo. On July 2, Aureliano rejected the plea of former
president Gen. Ernesto Geisel (who had earlier pushed Chaves to run for the presidency) for a
reunification of the PDS. Over the next week, Aureliano negotiated with his home-state rival
Tancredo, demanding guarantees for Liberal Front representation in a Neves cabinet. Tancredo
agreed to the vice-president's demands on July 10. As July ended, the Liberal Front joined in a
Democratic Alliance with the PMDB, and José Sarney became Tancredo's running mate. Brazilian
politics had witnessed a major realignment in the three months since April 25. This was the end of
the first stage of Game Two.
The second stage (August to November 1984) of Game Two was played by Tancredo
Neves, now the confident captain of the Democratic Alliance, and the armed forees. Tancredo's aim
was to prevent a coup or "military veto" of his candidacy, and he succeeded. Once again he was
aided by the shifting correlation of forces witl:1inthe PDS. On August 11, Maluf captured the PDS
nomination, as everyone knew he would. At this point, the supporters of Mario Andreazza, the
minister of the interior defeated at the convention by Maluf, threw their support to Tancredo. When
Délio Jardim de Mattos, the minister of the air force, called the PDS dissidents "traitors," the PDS
governor of Bahía, Antonio Carlos Magalháes, responded that the real "traitor" was Délio, who
supported the "corrupt" Maluf. Since 1964, no one had ever publicly spoken to a military minister
in this way. Governor Magalháes had struck an important symbolic blow against the military and
its candidate, a blow that worked in favor of Tancredo. Malufs prestige was now at an all-time
low. His candidacy was mortal1y wounded after Magalháes's September 4 remark, and it seemed
almost unpatriotic to support Maluf thereafter.
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The last remaining battle foe Tancredo was to negotiate directly with the military in order
to forestall a coup. How Tancredo succeeded at this is only partially lrnown, as many of his
meetings with military officers were kept secreL What is lrnown is that he held lengthy discussions
with President Figueiredo, Army Minister Walter Pires, and with Gen. Octávio Medeiros, head of
the National Information Service (SNI). Tancredo also met with the influential former president
Geisel, and was photographed in an embrace with Geisel upon leaving the general's horne.
Meanwhile, army sectors in Brasilia were probably bebind a propaganda campaign linking
Tancredo to the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB). If a coup did corne, it was expected to be led by
the extremist general in command of the Federal District garrison, Gen. Newton Cruz. General
Cruz raised eyebrows in mid-October by planning exercises featuring a mock defense of the
Planalto. In Tancredo's view, a successful transition depended on the neutralization of General
Cruz. While UIysses Guimaráes urged leaders of civil society to publicly discourage a coup,
Tancredo continued to meet secretly with high-ranking officers in all the service branches.
On November 20, the Army High Command met and removed Gen. Newton Cruz from
the military command of the Planalto, transferring him to an innocuous bureaucratic post. This
action defused the last rumors of a military coup. Tancredo Neves, who now controlled a majority
in the 686-member Electoral ColIege scheduled to meet in January, had crossed the final hurdle
between him and the presidency. True to bis reputation, he had masterfulIy effected a "conciliation
among elites," ftrst among civilian politicians (stage one), then among the armed forces (stage
two). Tancredo Neves defeated Paulo Maluf by 480 votes to 180 votes in the Electoral ColIege on
January 15, 1985.
Tbe Two Games in Review
Having described in brief how Game One (mass mobilization) and Game Two (elite
conciliation) were played out, 1 would now like .to comment on three aspects of the games. First, I
shall discuss how the initiation of the 1984-1985 transition is compatible with Adam Przeworski's
model, and 1 shalI bring a second theory of collective action to bear upon bis work. Second, 1 shall
review and compare the basic characteristics of Games One and Two. FinalIy, 1 shall discuss the
particular resuIts of the two games in the context of the 1984 realignment of political forces in
Brazil.
First, przeworski's model is attentive not onIy to the question of how political transitions
begin but also to the dynamic period of shifting coalitions that follows. Przeworski mentions both
putschist signals and objective signals that may start the game. A typical exampIe of the putschist
variety wouId be Aureliano Chaves's decIaration, in earIy February 1984, that he stood by the goals
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of the diretas já movement. Aureliano eventually supported the opposition candidate. The
outstanding objective signal óf 1984 was the diretas já campaign itself (which przeworski would
term a "signal," but which I have called a "game"), which in effect destroyed the remaining
legitimacy of the military regime. According to Przeworski, these signals pointed to an irnminent
division of the ruling bloc (see table 1), and certain regime leaders (Chaves is a perfect example)
may have been expected to look outside the bloc for support.
In considering the division of the military regime, it is useful to point out here that PDS
dissidents were faced with a classic problem of collective action in Game Two (see przeworski's
discussion of k-groups). It is apparent that all the eventual PDS supporters of Tancredo Neves did
not defect en masse, but that certain key players took early and visible risks, later inducing others to
follow. This group might represent what Oliver, Marwell, and Teixeira have termed the "critical
mass." According to them, "collective action usually depends on a 'critical mass' that behaves
differently from other group members. Sometimes the critical mass provides some level of the
good for others who do nothing, while at other times the critical mass pays the start-up costs and
induces widespread collective action" (1985: 522).
It is important not to confuse the "critical mass" with the k-group. The critical mass is
that group of "instigators" that initiates collective action; the k-group is that group (the critical
mass plus its allies) that is then large enough to pro vide the collective good. I would argue that in
the case of the PDS defection, the critical mass was made up of the highly visible Aureliano
Chaves plus the founders of the Liberal Front, Sens. Sarney, Maciel, and Bornhausen. One cannot
claim to know exactly when k was reached in terms of the collective good desired by the Liberal
Front (operationalized as the number of votes necessary to elect Tancredo Neves and one of its own,
José Sarney, in the Electoral College). But the potential success of the "critical mass" of defectors
was already evident by the end of July 1934, when the Liberal Front formed the Democratic
Alliance with the PMDB. In light of this distinction, I feel that the theory of the critical mass adds
an important dimension to przeworski's discussion of the division of the ruling bloc. Without
bringing in the concept of the critical mass, it is impossible to account for the simple fact that
some PDS defections were more important than others. The resignation of José Sarney as president
of the PDS would weigh heavily in this category.
The theories discussed above are persuasive in their explanation of how the political
transition began. Now let me briefly review the nature of the two games that were played in this
transition. As 1 have already discussed these games at length, 1 shall merely list their major
characteristics in table 2.
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Although altemative games might have been played in the Brazilian case, the two games
were in fact structured in the manner outlined above. What were the unique consequences resulting
from the fact that these particular games were played, and not others? First, the diretas jd campaign
(coupled with the nomination of Malut) caused the PDS to divide and produced the Liberal Front
The Liberal Front saw its only hope for political power in an alliance with the PMDB. This
resulted in the Democratic Alliance which currentIy govems Brazil. Second, the fact that the f1fSt
game (mobilization for direct elections) failed was the key to the personal success ofTancredo
Table 2
The Two Games in the Brazilian Transition
Game One (Jan-Apr 1984) Game Two lM~-Nov 1984)
Ideal type mass mobilization elite conciliation
Arena Public Private













Neves. As noted, he was the opposition's finest player at Game Two (elite conciliation). In other
words, it was the structure 01 the game itself that produeed the opposition's winning ticket:
Taneredo Neves and José Samey.
This faet took on unanticipated and eontrolling importance in March 1985, when
Taneredo Neves died before he eould assume offiee, leaving José Samey of the Liberal Front (now a
PMDB member on paper) as the new President of Brazil. As Mainwaring notes, "the fact that an
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old regime leader became president of the New Republic was telling of the kind of compromises
which were made to depose. the military regime." Mainwaring characterizes Brazil's political
trajectory in 1984-1986 as one "fromelite-led transition to elitistdemocracy" (1986: 171-175).
Conclusions: Tbe Masses and tbe Critical Mass
This paper has reviewed the transition to civilian role in Brazil from the perspective of
strategic choice analysis. I have argued that the transition was characterized by two successive
games in 1984. Game One, the mobilization in favor of direct elections, helped to provoJre a crisis
within the military regime. Game Two saw the realignment of political forces which brought
about the demise of the regime and assured a successful transition. To explain Game One, I drew
on Adam Przeworski's strategic calculus model of democratic transition. To help explain Game
Two, I briefIy drew upon the "critical mass" theory of collective action outlined by Oliver,
Marwell, and Teixeira. Where possible, I offered empirical evidence to support my assertions.
However, the primary objective of this essay was simply to offer an altemative conceptualization of
the Brazilian transition: a strategic choice model that stresses the importance of the way in which
politics is "played." This interpretation offers us some interesting insights into why the Brazilian
transition had such a unique outcome.
In conclusion, let me remark that the title of this paper is deliberately cynical. Although
"the masses" participated heavily in the movement 10ward democracy from January to April 1984
and achieved some significant victories, in the end it was a "critical mass" of traditional political
elites that brought about the transition. This phenomenon fits quite naturally within the his10rical
context of Brazilian politics. The masses have been systematically marginalized, while potitics has
been a game of "conciliation among elites." The fact that this game of conciliation characterized
Brazil's transition 10democracy in 1984-1985 is a telling cornmentary on the substantive content of
the country's new democracy. The transition emphasized continuity far more than change. Given
this, it appears that, at least in the short ron, Brazil's new democracy will continue to favor the
"critical mass" over the masses.
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Notes
1. The two most useful analyses of the 1974-1985 period are Mainwaring (1986) and Smith
(1987). For a wide-ranging collection of essays on recent Brazilian politicallife, see Selcher
(1986).
2. I must stress that these "games" are, of course, ideal types. The mass mobilization game..was
essentially the brainchild of opposition politicians; in no meaningful way could the diretas já
campaign be considered "spontaneous." However, my approach here views the campaign as the
demonstration of what Charles Anderson has called a "power capability." Despite its utilization by
opposition politicians, this capability for mass mobilization in 1984 clearly belonged to Brazilian
civil society. The elite conciliation game represents an ideal type that is much closer to reality.
The masses could not and did not participate in this second game, unless one allows for the impact
which public opinion had on the calculations of the negotialOrs in late 1984.
3. The diretas já campaign was planned and carried out over a periad of several months, which
makes it unlike other mobilizations or demonstrations (leaving aside extended strikes) in madem
times. These have typically revolved around specific events or incidents. Examples include rioting
after Vargas's suicide in 1954, the pro- and anti-Goulart marches of 1963 and early 1964, and
various demonstrations to protest political killings by the military regime (student Edson Luis de
Lima Souto in 1968, joumalist Vladimir Herzog in 1975, etc.).
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